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San Francisco 
The Politics of Race and Sex
Garth L. Mangum
University of Utah
San Francisco has to be counted among the most capable 
prime sponsors in the nation. But competence in the CETA 
system must be assessed by the sponsors' ability to respond 
to local circumstances, rather than by a set of national stan 
dards.
This summary first sketches the economic and political en 
vironment within which CETA functions in San Francisco. 
It then describes the planning and decisionmaking processes 
that govern the city's CETA activities, including the nature 
of the staff and the roles of federal and state governments. 
That leads to a description of the program that has emerged 
from those decisions. Finally, it appraises the quality of 
training in San Francisco's CETA programs and offers in 
sights for understanding the national system.
The Political Economy-of San Francisco
Race and sex politics is the key to understanding CETA in 
San Francisco, a fact that has its origins more in the area's 
geography than in its economy.
Geography and Population
Bounded on the north and east by San Francisco Bay, on 
the west by the Pacific Ocean, and boxed in on the south by 
another political jurisdiction, San Francisco encompasses 
only 49 square miles. With this limited area and only 650,000 
residents, it is relatively small in numbers as cities go, but it is 
one of the most densely populated areas in the United States.
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Widely renowned for the beauty of its physical setting and its 
cosmopolitan atmosphere, and serving as the major U.S. 
door to the Pacific, the area has experienced pressures on its 
housing market that have tended to prevent the deterioration 
of private and public buildings seen in many other cities. 
Slums develop and are rehabilitated through private financ 
ing in relatively short cycles.
The white non-Hispanics, who dominate the U.S. popula 
tion are a minority (49 percent) in San Francisco. Because 
the city is the U.S. door from, as well as to, the Pacific, 
Asians and Pacific islanders comprise the second largest 
population category (about 20 percent of the total). Within 
that group are people from at least a dozen nations, the 
largest groups being Chinese and Filipinos. The inflow of 
Orientals waxes and wanes with the fortunes of war and the 
economies in the Far East, with Indochina the major source 
in recent years. In third place is the substantial black popula 
tion (16 percent of the total), which had its origin during the 
shipbuilding boom during the Second World War and has 
experienced little influx since. Finally, the majority of San 
Francisco's Hispanics (14 percent of the total) have their 
roots in Central and South America, with relatively few 
Mexican-Americans and fewer Mexican nationals.
The proportions of the population who are CETA 
eligibles—that is, the long term unemployed living in pover 
ty, and those receiving benefits under the program of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—are all 
remarkably consistent with the ethnic ratios, except that 
blacks are overrepresented and Chinese underrepresented 
among the unemployed poor. By age, young adults are over- 
represented in comparison with national norms, indicating 
San Francisco's role as a youth mecca during the 1960s, and 
its continued attractiveness to young singles.
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The strong social and ethnic consciousness among San 
Francisco's population is perhaps not remarkable, but the 
degree of political organization and potency is. The city has 
at least a dozen strongly organized political associations bas 
ed on ethnicity. Homosexuals, both gays and lesbians, con 
stitute another well-organized and aggressive political entity. 
The rights of women, the handicapped, and the aging are the 
foci of other politically potent groups. Each of these has its 
role in GET A politics.
Government
Despite its apparent unification, the consolidated city/ 
county government in San Francisco is almost as divided as 
its political constituencies. City government scandals in the 
1930s led to a deliberate weakening of government. A mayor 
is chosen at large in nonpartisan elections. A board of super 
visors, each elected from a different section of the city, plays 
the legislative role. A chief executive officer—appointed by 
the mayor, confirmed by the board and removable only by 
impeachment—is responsible for administering the major 
departments of government such as health and sanitation. 
Another batch of professionally oriented services (such as 
police and fire) report to commissions also appointed by pre 
sent and past mayors but removable only by impeachment. 
A group of relatively independent agencies, such as the air 
port, have the power to generate and spend their own funds, 
yet every expenditure must be approved by the finance com 
mittee of the board of supervisors. Several other agencies, 
such as the housing authority and the Bay Area Rapid Tran 
sit district, known as BART, are city/state organizations 
that operate outside the city civil service.
The mayor gains substantial independent power through 
federal programs such as GET A. Appeal to the various race 
and sex organizations is the key to electoral success. Organiz-
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ed labor traditionally has been a power in San Francisco 
politics, but its influence has withered as blue-collar employ 
ment drifted out of the city.
Perhaps because of the lack of other elective entities, the 
school districts in San Francisco are a focus of political ac 
tivism, despite a relatively small school-age population. The 
San Francisco unified school district is responsible for 
elementary and secondary schools, the community college 
district for San Francisco City College and nine community 
college centers, which include adult education. The city also 
has an extensive parochial school system, an extraordinary 
number of private elementary and secondary schools, small 
colleges, and private proprietary training institutions. There 
is also in the city the state-supported San Francisco State 
University and the University of San Francisco, affiliated 
with the Catholic Church.
The Economy
In the past 30 years, San Francisco has shifted from a 
blue-collar labor market based in shipping, shipbuilding, 
warehousing, and manufacturing to a predominantly white- 
collar market based in company headquarters and govern 
mental agencies. Shipping activity and traditional manufac 
turing have tended to move across the bay to Oakland, and 
other East Bay locations, while newer manufacturing enter 
prises have settled in the "silicon valleys" of the peninsula, 
some 30 miles away. Meanwhile, the selection of San Fran 
cisco as a regional headquarters for federal and state govern 
ment activities has added to public employment. The 
westward movement of the U.S. center of economic gravity 
and the country's growing trans-Pacific ties have changed 
San Francisco's skyline (much to the chagrin of many local 
residents) by the growth of downtown corporate head 
quarters.
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The outflow of manufacturing and the inflow of govern 
ment reduced the city's tax base, as did the 1978 Proposition 
13 limitation on local property tax rates. As a result, public 
services have deteriorated somewhat and the city has become 
more anxious to grasp every source of state and federal 
funds available.
San Francisco's unemployment rate—5.4 percent in April 
1980 and 5.9 percent in May 1980—is not high for a central 
city. In fact, even construction activity was being maintained 
halfway through 1980. More notable is the abundance of 
white-collar and the dearth of manual jobs. All 41 occupa 
tions listed as demand categories for CETA purposes in the 
spring of 1980 were in the professional, clerical, sales, and 
service categories. Among San Francisco's job openings, on 
ly automotive repair, building maintenance, and truckdriv- 
ing, along with a few jobs for welders and machine 
operators, could be described as blue-collar. Almost all of 
the recent employment expansion has been concentrated in 
services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and retail 
trades. That industry and occupation structure is clearly ap 
parent in the choice of CETA clientele and activities in San 
Francisco.
Planning and Decisionmaking
Planning is, of course, a staff function but decisionmak- 
ing involves not only the prime sponsor's staff, but also the 
mayor and her staff, the board of supervisors, the employ 
ment and training council, and the influential community- 
based organizations (CBOs). Federal and state officials have 
a pro forma role, but not much more.
Staff Qualifications
The outstanding capability of the San Francisco prime 
sponsor is attributable primarily to the quality and influence
328
of its staff. Their combination of longevity, experience, in 
fluence, and technical competence is unlikely to be exceeded 
anywhere in the GET A system.
The staff director, Eunice Elton, has been called the 
"mother of manpower" in San Francisco. She is a 43-year 
veteran of the California State Employment Service who has 
managed local offices, regional field offices, and antipoverty 
specialty programs, and directed the San Francisco Concen 
trated Employment Program (CEP), and its Community 
Manpower Program, which was CETA's predecessor. She 
has directed the Mayor's Office of Employment and Train 
ing (MOET) from the beginning of CETA (under three suc 
cessive mayors) and her technical judgments are considered 
beyond challenge in the city. Her position is even more in 
vulnerable than her credentials, because she has remained on 
the Employment Service payroll throughout her CETA ser 
vice and is beyond retirement age.
Ray Holland—director of the planning, evaluation, and 
management information system from CETA's initia 
tion—is a veteran of the Peace Corps and the community ac 
tion program.
Elton and Holland are the only "Anglos" among the top 
staff. The two program directors, one for employability 
development (training) and youth programs and the other 
for public service employment programs, also have MDTA 
and Economic Development Act program experience and 
have held their positions from the beginning of CETA. One 
is of Puerto Rican-Filipino origin, the other of Chinese de 
scent. The heads of the various housekeeping departments 
have been with MOET from the beginning though they have 
been promoted from lower level positions. Currently, the 
three top staff members heading these departments are a 
Chinese, a black, and a Mexican-American. There is con 
siderable turnover in subordinate positions but almost none 
in top management.
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Staff stability has been maintained despite the absence of 
formal job protection. All MOET employees are temporary 
city employees who, along with most of the mayor's staff, 
cannot achieve tenure. They receive health benefits and vaca 
tions but no retirement benefits. They are paid according to 
the entrance rate for the city's regular civil service grades but 
receive no in-grade step increases, so they earn less than their 
peers, although they face as many, if not more, job 
pressures. The explanation for MOET's staff stability must 
be adrenalin intoxication.
MOET has done an unusual job of structuring its lower 
ranks so that GET A enrollees can join the staff as 
paraprofessionals and then, by substituting experiences for 
academic credentials and perhaps taking further training, 
rise to technical and even professional roles. The Labor 
Department's regional training center is given high marks by 
the staff and community college and time off can be 
negotiated for university courses. Although staff develop 
ment has included training workshops, it has consisted 
primarily of guided on-the-job experience.
Prime Sponsor As Decisionmaker
MOET is a paradoxical decisionmaker. Probably no 
CETA prime sponsor is more data-oriented and planning- 
minded, yet few others are more politically responsive in 
their decisions. The MOET staff is personally well shielded 
from political influence, yet recognizes the necessity of 
responding to political pressures on the employment and 
training council, the mayor, and the board of supervisors.
MOET's staff of qualified planners accumulates the 
available labor market information and adds a good bit of its 
own. It has a highly sophisticated management information 
system and knows almost constantly what is going on 
amongst a vast array of contractors. Although its decisions
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are, for the most part, promptly, smoothly, and objectively 
made, ultimately they must be recognized as political.
To a large extent, the nature of the labor market and the 
unusual competence of politically potent institutions make 
possible this combination of objectivity and politics. The 
San Francisco labor market has no mysteries on the demand 
side. It is diversified, homogeneous, and stable.
It is diversified because no one industry or set of firms 
dominates it, nor does its activity rise or fall appreciably with 
any one set of economic forces. As an export-import center, 
its international markets are so diversified that no one coun 
try's economic colds can become its pneumonia.
It is homogeneous because it is a white-collar and service 
market. San Francisco houses corporate headquarters and 
financial institutions, not producing or materials-handling 
facilities. Its jobs are white-collar managerial, not technical 
or scientific. Surrounding those managerially oriented jobs 
are service jobs (in and out of the firms) that support the ex 
ecutive workforce. Its use as a regional headquarters for 
both federal and state governments intensifies the central 
focus on management.
Because these activities tend to emphasize overhead per 
sonnel, San Francisco's labor market does fluctuate as much 
as would a more production-oriented economy. Its set of 
clerical and data processing occupations seem always to be in 
demand, and employers' demand and employees' turnover 
can guarantee relatively continuous employment opportuni 
ty in a number of service occupations. If demand is quite 
stable, a satisfactory set of institutions and programs can be 
developed and continued.
On the supply side, San Francisco has a remarkably 
diverse but unusually sophisticated population. The stream 
of immigrants from both domestic and foreign sources tends
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to be those who departed by choice and selected their 
destination. The most successful from along the rim of the 
Pacific basin—Asian, Latin-American, and Pacific 
Islanders—choose San Francisco as their new home. They 
tend to combine relatively low incomes with education and 
other characteristics not generally associated with poverty. 
The domestic youth movement makes San Francisco a target 
for a new life style. The typical indigenous underclass is less 
notable than in many central cities.
Thus, San Francisco's population includes many who are 
eligible for CETA by economic criteria, yet who possess an 
organizational and political capability unusual in a poverty 
community. Most of these community-based organizations 
(CBOs) are indigenous to San Francisco; the national 
organization play little or no role in CETA decisionmaking 
or the delivery of services. What other prime sponsor in the 
system states explicitly in its request for proposals (RFP) that 
priority will be given to programs providing services to gays 
and lesbians? San Francisco's indigenous CBOs can obtain 
access to resources and then deliver services with a level of 
competence that is generally beyond challenge.
The area's economic stability has made it possible to 
predict a continuing need for a familiar set of services. 
Therefore, MOET has been able to set criteria which, when 
met, qualify the contractor for guaranteed 3-year fund 
ing—not for a stipulated amount of money, because federal 
funds cannot be known in advance, but for a proportionate 
share of the action. Of nearly 200 MOET contractors, 14 are 
in that secure status currently.
As decisionmaker, therefore, MOET has been able to re 
spond to political realities but defend its actions by standard, 
objective economic criteria. The use of labor market infor 
mation to determine service needs and of management infor 
mation to evaluate performance need not lead to markedly
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different decisions than those which politics would have dic 
tated.
For related reasons, MOET has been able to spread the 
base of decisionmaking without losing control of the deci- 
sionmaking process. Its advisory employment and training 
council, though too large for optimal effectiveness, is very 
active in its decisionmaking, but generally sides with the staff 
on most issues. The council is made up of roughly one-third 
ex officio members from public agencies, one-third mayoral 
appointees representing various interest groups, and one- 
third appointees of the board of supervisors drawn from 
geographical areas of the city.
The council's two most potent committees are the plan 
ning committee and the evaluation committee. The first 
decides annually how the budget will be distributed by 
enrollee characteristics and service functions. The evaluation 
committee is supplied twice a year with a mass of data on 
contractors' performance. Then each contractor must 
publicly defend its stewardship. The careful preparation, 
volume, and sophistication of the data supplied by MOET 
staff make it highly unlikely that the council will refute it. A 
former MOET staff member, now in the mayor's office, also 
sits in on all of these sessions so that the mayor's preferences 
get into the decision stream early, while the staff has a strong 
advocate with the mayor.
If the staff gets overruled, as it does occasionally, it is 
generally by the board of supervisors, which is much more 
difficult to reach and influence as a body, although any 
board member can be more easily subjected to political 
pressure from outside.
Monthly meetings of all MOET contractors provide infor 
mation, communication, and an opportunity to vent feelings 
and frustrations.
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Despite MOET's adroit decisionmaking process and its 
favorable economic setting, the presence of the competent 
but political CBOs has costs as well as advantages. Some 
CETA activities which staff members consider to be of high 
potential, notably individual referral and high-support on- 
the-job training discussed below, are difficult to defend for 
lack of a political constituency. Politics need not and 
generally do not force acceptance of a less than adequate 
program but it may block an outstanding one that lacks 
political support.
Federal, State, Local Relations
MOET has the advantage of history in its relations with 
both the DOL regional office and the state CETA system. In 
effect, MOET, in the person of Eunice Elton, was there first 
and the others are newcomers. The state CETA system has 
no supervisory role over any prime sponsor. However, San 
Francisco has done reasonably well in garnering governor's 
discretionary funds. The State Employment Development 
Department spends considerable state CETA money in the 
city. In addition, a variety of state-funded programs con 
tribute significantly to the resources available to the city.
Probably the most significant fact of MOET's relationship 
with other government bodies is that federal regional staff 
rarely hassles anyone from MOET. Residence in the regional 
office city helps, because misunderstandings sometimes grow 
with distance. MOET staff reports favorable experience with 
the regional training center run by a local consulting firm of 
strong reputation in the employment and training field. 
Beyond that, the regional staff is most helpful by not second- 
guessing MOET's decisions or intervening in its activities.
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Training Policies and Practices
San Francisco's CETA program—its funding, 
enrollments, and performance—demonstrate a clear and 
longstanding preference for training over all other CETA 
services if training is defined broadly as employability 
development. In fact, that is the name of the MOET ad 
ministrative unit responsible for all services except public 
service employment. What do CETA-eligible residents need 
to make them acceptable to employers in the stable San 
Francisco economy? Given the diversity of the population, it 
is not surprising that the most frequent answer is "enough 
command of English to be able to function in a white-collar 
or service job."
Table 1 summarizes the total CETA budget and 
enrollments for fiscal 1979. Of the Title II B-C funding total 
over which the prime sponsor had considerable discretion, 
56 percent was spent on classroom training and 16 percent 
for on-the-job training. The 10 percent spent on work ex 
perience was, in effect, mandated.

































Maintenance of effort requirements imposed by the Youth 
Employment Demonstration Projects Act of 1977 dictate 
that MOET reserve 48 percent of its Title II-B CETA slots 
for youth. A substantial amount of these services take the 
form of work experience, because many youth are not 
prepared to settle down to a training program or to work in 
its intended occupations afterward. Work experience is an 
acceptable "aging vat," but the MOET director objects to 
the way that theory works out in practice. School counselors 
too often refer students who are not CETA-eligible to any 
jobs they hear about, usually with private employers, 
because they know publicly subsidized jobs are available for 
disadvantaged youth. Thus, youth with the best out-of- 
school contacts leading to the regular labor market get fur 
ther reinforcement and those without any such contacts are 
diverted to a semi-income maintenance situation.
MOET has little or no control over that situation but has 
an explicit policy forbidding work experience programs for 
adults. Nine percent of Title II B-C funds were spent on sup 
portive services for the disadvantaged clientele. For public 
service employment under Title II-D, MOET is inaugurating 
an approach for 1981 in which PSE enrollees will spend half 
the day in classroom training and the other half on the job 
applying those skills. Title VI will remain standard PSE.
San Francisco CETA also has one other important non- 
training service—advocacy programs. Seven contractors 
have an explicit affirmative action role on behalf of age, 
race, sex, or handicap groups. They provide no significant 
training or employment. These agencies have been effective 
in the comfortable demand situation in working with 
employers to meet affirmative action goals by hiring CETA 
eligibles of various characteristics. The advocacy programs 
and miscellaneous services absorb the 9 percent of Title II 
B-C funds not accounted for above.
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In fiscal 1979, 192 contractors had assignments to deliver 
CETA services in San Francisco. Of these, 146 were hosts for 
public service employment. Seventeen supplied classroom 
training and seven promoted on-the-job training, in addition 
to the seven advocacy contractors. The largest investment is 
in English as a second language (ESL). For several contract 
ing institutions, ESL is the primary reason for being. Each 
concentrates on a specific language group: Spanish, Chinese, 
Korean, Filipino and so forth. Each teaches English in a skill 
training context, primarily clerical skills, and therefore most 
of their pupils are women. For smaller numbers of men, each 
also provides some training in service occupations as a vehi 
cle for language training.
A larger group of contractors emphasize skill training and 
treat language training as an adjunct skill. For instance, the 
Jewish Vocational Service has an outstanding program for 
Russian Jewish emigres. Because most of the emigres have 
university degrees, knowledge of U.S. weights and measures 
and similar material is taught to refurbish chemists, 
engineers, and so forth, with English instruction as an add 
on. With help from the Jewish Vocational Service, a similar 
program is being designed for Vietnamese.
Nonlanguage training institutions in San Francisco also 
tend to concentrate on a single skill or a narrow range of 
skills. Thus, the choice of an institution at which to enroll is 
equivalent to a choice of training type. Intake is centralized 
only for youth. For those with language problems that is no 
handicap, because enrollees must be referred to the institu 
tion specializing in their native language. For others, 
however, it means that the accident of contact determines the 
nature of the training opportunity. The sophisticated may 
learn of all of the alternative institutions and their offerings 
and select from among them. Those who go to a Job Service 
office and are fortunate enough to find an interviewer who
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recognizes their CETA eligibility may be referred to 
whatever the interviewer knows to be available. A Youth 
Service Office, funded by MOET and operated by Job Ser 
vice, provides central referral services for the young. But 
what is available for them is primarily work experience. A 
Job Service office located in the MOET building has a con 
tract to make individual referrals to ongoing programs in 
regular public and private schools.
San Francisco has no actual skill center, even though one 
institution bears that name. Under the Manpower Develop 
ment and Training Act, it approached but never achieved the 
qualification requirements for a skill center; the provision of 
training in a broad range of occupations, onsite counseling, 
job development and placement, and supportive services, 
and a concentration on the disadvantaged. In the interim, it 
has become one of nine nondegree community college 
centers serving a broader audience. It now serves CETA 
primarily by accepting individual referrals who can function 
on a par with its other students. Its one class-size CETA pro 
ject—for health care professionals—has an excellent place 
ment record but is somewhat selective in its enrollment.
The skill center is an example of a simultaneous boon and 
bane built into the California education system. When a 
CETA client enrolls in a tax supported school, that school is 
rewarded with the same average daily attendance education 
funds it would receive for any other student. Hence, the 
school usually absorbs the training costs; only the training 
stipend comes from CETA sources. That allows an attractive 
leverage of the CETA training dollar, but it may also bias 
training decisions. Better training in some fields may be 
available from private institutions, but the trade-off between 
the higher cost of these institutions and the pressure to 
spread available funds to serve more enrollees may tip the 
balance in favor of public institutions.
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Some of the MOET staff would prefer a centralized intake 
system for assessing all enrollees and referring them to the 
institution offering the most appropriate mix of services. In 
stitutions that specialize in services for particular age-race- 
national origin-sex groups, however, would resent such in 
tervention between them and their client groups and have the 
clout to prevent it, so the MOET staff has never actually pro 
posed to centralize intake.
The staff also harbors two related preferences that are not 
politically viable. Neither has a constituency of its own, and 
both are opposed by powerful community groups.
One is an expansion of the individual referral program. 
The majority of San Francisco CETA eligibles have high 
school diplomas and many have some college credits. By 
selecting trainees carefully and working with the schools, the 
staff members feel they could overcome the need for suppor 
tive services and purchase a higher level of training. The staff 
desire to move to training in higher level skills, even at higher 
per enrollee costs, reflects a nostalgic pride in the MOET 
Skill Training Improvement program experiences, all of 
which had been completed before this study began. This ap 
proach, too, would face opposition from those with vested 
interest in CBO based programs. The staff hopes to expand 
upgrading programs and does not expect as much opposi 
tion, because that emphasis probably can be accommodated 
within the current mix of contractors.
Similar political problems exist for the second staff 
preference: more and better on-the-job training. As noted 
above, the national CBOs have no political clout in the city. 
Only the local Urban League advocates OJT but the power 
lies with the indigenous organizations, which tend to look at 
OJT as a diversion from the resources available to them.
The staff also has no preference for standard low support 
OJT, which is seen as merely a wage subsidy for small
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employers. However, they are enthusiastic about high- 
support OJT, of which there have been some outstanding ex 
amples. Primarily in response to affirmative action 
pressures, public utilities and other large employers have oc 
casionally approached MOET or a contractor, and CETA- 
eligible persons have been selected to meet these employers' 
needs. A MOET contractor has provided vestibule training 
in simulated work settings. Grooming, deportment, and 
basic education, as well as entry level skills, have been stress 
ed. Then the enrollees have moved into an OJT phase but 
still have been coached by the contractor until secure in their 
jobs.
High level clerical, substantial technical, and low level 
management positions have been obtained in this way. A 
consortium of engineering and architectural firms is current 
ly inducting young blacks into technician positions by the 
high support OJT approach. But such opportunities are 
sporadic. Employers that can provide them cannot be per 
suaded by a modest wage subsidy. They respond to their own 
needs, and their affirmative action emphasis is shifting from 
the entry level to the upgrading stage. Employers will not 
participate in the competitive RFP process, so someone has 
to act as surrogate for them. Without strong direct ad 
vocacy, it is difficult for MOET staff to retain an uncommit 
ted pool of OJT funds to respond quickly to employer invita 
tion. Any uncommitted funds are well known to the CBOs, 
which bring pressure on the employment and training coun 
cil, board of supervisors, and mayor for their allocation.
High-support OJT seems unattainable as a regular pro 
gram, but it has been accomplished often enough to remain a 
tantalizing dream to the MOET staff.
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The Quality and Results of Training
One could summarize training in San Francisco CETA by 
saying that:
1. Employability development in a broad sense is the first 
priority of nearly all actors in the system.
2. The language problems of new immigrants are so over 
whelming as to swamp other needs.
3. The skills, qualifications, and commitments of the im 
migrants are sufficient, combined with a favorable 
labor market and competent trainers, to guarantee high 
placement rates and even higher retention.
4. The mix of services and service deliverers is probably 
not optimum, but it certainly is defensible.
The correlation between program quality and program 
outcomes is distorted by the nature of the population and the 
labor market. The ESL programs are the most successful, 
even though not necessarily of the highest quality. The 
facilities are generally crowded and uninspiring. The instruc 
tors must meet community college certification requirements 
and are generally competent and committed. Over time, the 
instructors in the various ESL programs in San Francisco 
have developed their own approach and denominated it as 
vocational English as a Second Language. They all tend to 
take pride in and use the same approach, regardless of 
language. There is no way to separate the competence of the 
instructor and the quality of the curriculum from the com 
mitment of the student body in assessing results. What is 
clear is that the participants do learn English—at least 
enough to get by and get a job. The job skills components of 
ESL are generally not well-equipped and often seem to be an 
afterthought. Nevertheless, placement and retention rates in 
the high 80s are standard across the ESL range and are 
bought at very low per enrollee costs.
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The quality of individual referral is dependent upon the 
quality of the institutions involved. The private proprietary 
schools are designed to meet the market and generally have 
impressive facilities and excellent equipment. Their major 
handicaps from a CETA standpoint is that many CETA 
eligibles have not been able to survive in those competitive 
environments. Most of the community colleges also offer 
good facilities and instruction and adequate equipment. 
However, the skill center is housed in an abandoned elemen 
tary school and carries the marks of a second class institu 
tion. Nevertheless its health programs are taught by profes 
sionals who maintain high quality.
Most impressive in the San Francisco setting are the high 
support OJT projects. The initial pre-entry training is ade 
quate but the employer involvement and commitment to hire 
is what makes all the difference. But these are sporadic and 
difficult to mount.
All in all, San Francisco can be described as a CETA 
system with a successful training emphasis, more because of 
the nature of the population and the economy than because 
of the training quality. In fact, San Francisco's native black 
and white poor would debate its effectiveness for them.
Capacity to Develop 
and Manage Training Programs
All of these factors are reflected in the development and 
management of CETA training programs. Stability of need 
and offering reduces the challenge to develop new programs 
and new approaches. That which works well can be con 
tinued without need for continuous modifications and new 
beginnings. A combination of ESL and clerical training is 
relatively easy to put together. Decentralized delivery lets the 
prime sponsor hold the contractors' feet to the fire without
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having to take full and direct responsibility for managing the 
training program.
Still there are always prices to pay. A decision to decen 
tralize to service units sponsored by politically potent groups 
means that almost every group has a right to a funded in 
stitution of its own. They cannot all be equally competent. 
Only in dire circumstances can one national origin group be 
denied any funding and its constituents required to seek ser 
vice from another group's entity. The California system of 
state-supported educational institutions offering free tuition 
is a boon to the leveraging of CETA funds, but it may lock 
MOET into continuation with a mediocre institution because 
of the low per enrollee cost. More selective individual refer 
rals and more high support OJT are the staffs own non- 
political preferences. The price of survival in a political at 
mosphere is compromise. But MOET has been able to mount 
an impressive service delivery mechanism in a political set 
ting which could have been chaotic.
The diversified employability development system also has 
the advantage of being readily expandable. MOET received, 
in 1980, proposals for over twice as much training as it was 
able to fund. The capacity for individual referral is almost 
infinite, given the number of private as well as public train 
ing institutions in the city. None of the San Francisco CETA 
training programs is capital-intensive and expansion of 
language training requires only instructors, which are plen 
tiful. Every program has a substantial waiting list of eligible 
applicants. MOET staff believes classroom training could be 
expanded by one-half in a few months if given the funding. 
Expanded classroom funding would also take the opposing 
political pressures off high support OJT, freeing resources to 
develop more of those programs.
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Conclusion
CETA in San Francisco is well managed by any set of stan 
dards. Its decisionmaking has a broad base and responds to 
both politics and economics. Its staff is not plagued by turn 
over and has extraordinary competence. The federal agency 
is neither a help nor a service hindrance. A major training 
need—the Americanization of a new generation of im 
migrants—has been identified and is being met within the 
limits of available resources. All of these achievements are 
being accomplished in a highly politicized atmosphere, and 
the response to those pressures is adroit. One might argue for 
a different response—one that would centralize intake and 
assign clients to training institutions by need and capability. 
But politics is as real as economics, and there is no obvious 
way to choose between them.
